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I. INTRODUCTION: TURKEY’S PATTERN OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS 
The Republic of Turkey was founded with the help of its armed forces but it was 
never intended to be a military regime.1 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk charged the military to 
be the guardian of society but was also adamant that the military remain out of politics. 
The former general banned serving officers from holding political positions for fear that 
the political process would corrupt the military.2 As early as 1923 Ataturk believed that 
republicanism and civilian control of the military were the keys to the success of the 
Western nations.3 He established a civilian administration and secured the backing of the 
military by legitimizing the army’s role as the defender and protector of society.4 Despite 
Ataturk’s vision, the generals became entangled in Turkish politics beginning with the 
first military coup d'état of 1960. Since then Turkey has wavered between democracy, 
technocracy, and military rule. 
Turkey’s level of democratic civilian control of its armed forces (DCAF) can be 
charted beginning in the 1950s. Each of the four military interventions in Turkish politics 
pushed Turkey’s civil-military relations farther away from the liberal ideal of democratic 
civilian control in a definite pattern. Concurrently the Turkish National Security Council 
(Milli Guvelnik Kurulu -- MGK) created in 1961, continuously increased its political 
power following each intervention until 1997. 
A. DEPENDENT VARIABLE—DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE 
ARMED FORCES (DCAF) 
Democratic civilian control is attained when the sole legitimate source for the 
direction and actions of the military is derived from democratically elected civilians 
outside the military and defense establishment. Usually the military is the roadblock in 
 
1 When becoming President of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk traded his uniform for a suit. This set the 
standard that an officer must resign his commission before going into politics. However, once a General 
always a General, which was on of the reasons why Ataturk and Inonu maintained the support of the 
military during the First Republic 1923 to 1960. 
2 Jenkins, Gareth. (2001) Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics. Adelphi Paper 
337 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS), p. 33. 
3 Perlmutter, Amos. The Military and Politics in Modern Times. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977, p. 163. 
4 Perlmutter, 111. 
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this relationship when it refuses to accept civilian supremacy. Once DCAF is established, 
maintaining it is a dynamic process susceptible to changing ideas, values, circumstances, 
issues, personalities and to the stresses and crises of war. Civilian control of the armed 
forces is a process necessary to preserve the domestic liberty in a democratic society.5 
Taken to the extreme, DCAF could be interpreted as the elimination of all military 
prerogatives. However, a castrated military is neither practical nor desirable for reasons 
of national security. Some level of military autonomy is required.6 Therefore, when 
measuring DCAF the question is not whether it is present, but to what degree is it present. 
Alfred Stepan, who is most famous for his work on South American regimes, 
sought to understand how an authoritarian regime -- where the military played and 
important role in the State -- could change into a democracy capable of controlling the 
military.7 He measured the type of civil-military relations in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Spain during the 1980’s as a function of relative power and friction between the 
military and the elected government.8 Adapting a similar model to the Turkish case 
provides a way to gauge the level of DCAF over time as a function of civil-military 
friction and the political power of the military. Bounding the upper limits of the two 
independent variables creates a “property space” in which different values of DCAF can 
exist.9
The extreme edges of the Civ-Mil Friction and the Political Power of the 
Military axes define four categories of DCAF. These categories are: civilian control, 
unequal civilian accommodation, an unsustainable position for military leaders, and a 
 
5 Perlmutter, 6. 
6 This is inferred from Samuel Huntington’s definition of “objective civilian control” of the military 
where the military is a tool of the state. 
7 Stepan, Alfred. “The Military in Newly Democratic Regimes: The Dimension of Military 
Contestation.” Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 1988 p. 68. 
8 Stepan, 68. Stepan focused on two factors that he called the dimensions of civil-military relations: 
articulated military contestation and military prerogatives. These concepts will be referred respectively as 
friction and power. 
9 Stepan, 100. 
near untenable position for democratic leaders.10 Figure 1 shows the four categories of 
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Figure 1. Four Categories of Civil-Military Relations (After: Stepan, 100) 
The ideal level of civilian control is represented by the lower-left corner of the 
graph where friction and the military’s political power are both low. While civilian 
control implies complete subservience of the military to the elected officials, it does not 
mean the military has to be weak. In this corner of the graph, it means civilian 
preferences prevail over military preferences with respect to issues concerning the 
military and politics. One example would be parliamentary oversight of the defense 
budget. The United States and most Western democracies fall into this category. 
                                                 
3 
10 Stepan, 100. These are the names I gave to the categories defined by Stepan which are: Civilian 
control, an unsustainable position for military leaders, near untenable position for democratic leaders, and 
unequal civilian accommodation. 
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In circumstances where there is little civil-military friction and the military retains 
significant power, the civilian government is weaker than the armed forces. For example, 
in Brazil during the mid 1980’s, the political party system was fragile which allowed the 
military to maintain significant prerogatives vis-à-vis the politicians.11
If there is a high degree of civil-military friction but low military political power, 
the military has a lot of “bark but no bite.” This represents a “defanged” military and 
resembles a case which Samuel Huntington called “subjective civilian control.”12 The 
closest example to a “defanged” military is what happened to the CEE countries 
following the end of the Cold War. Military budgets and armed forces were slashed to 
accommodate other domestic reforms at the expense of military capabilities. This 
extreme case is an unsustainable position for military leaders. Spain during the attempted 
takeover of 1981 approached this quadrant.13
The final measure of DCAF is represented by a high degree of civil-military 
friction accompanied by a large number of powers granted to the military. This extreme 
region represents a situation untenable for a democratic government. From 1960 through 
1997 Turkey’s civil-military relations have moved farther away from civilian control 
towards the high, right corner of the graph. 
This two dimensional descriptive model is a convenient method to show changes 
in civil-military relations. It also lays the foundation to explain why the changes occurred. 
Based on historical observations of the interventions, an increase in Turkey’s civil-
military friction is followed by an increase in the political power of the military. The 
spark, or intervening variable, is a military coup d'état. Therefore the pattern of civil-
military relations in Turkey can be summarized as friction, coup, and power. The 
resultant power then became institutionalized into Turkish law. 
B. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF FRICTION AND POWER  
The two dimensions of democratic civilian control of the armed forces (DCAF) ar 
e friction and power. Civil-military friction is defined as the level of intense dispute or 
substantial agreement between the military and the politicians regarding a number of key 
 
11 Stepan, 93-128. 
12 Subjective civilian control exists when the civilians maximize their power over the military as an 
institution. In simple terms, the civilians control too much of the day to day business of the military.  
13 Stepan, 93-128. 
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issues whether publicly stated or not, provided it is “relevant to the military and political 
actors.”14 The second dimension of DCAF is the political power of the military which is 
defined as “a prior, exclusive, or peculiar right or privilege.” These are “areas where, 
whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired 
right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal 
governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even 
to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society.”15  
1. Sources of Civil-Military Friction 
The most obvious sources of civil-military friction in Turkey concern the 
definition of Kemalism, the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism (Irtica),16 Kurdish 
separatism, and membership in the EU. Less obvious sources of friction include the 
prestige and economic well-being of the military. To different extents these same sources 
of friction existed since Turkey’s transition to multiparty politics. During the 1950s and 
60s the social and economic status of the military officers became another significant 
source of contention. But the ultimate source of friction emerges from differing 
definitions of Kemalism between society, the politicians, and the military. 
Kemalism is the core philosophy underlying the establishment of the Turkish state 
since 1923 and proved a successful alternative to the ideologies of Fascism and 
Communism during the 1930s. In this period, the military became the de facto guardian 
of the Kemalist principles which form the fabric of the military’s attitude towards society 
and the politicians. Kemalism consists of six pillars commonly referred to as the “six 
arrows”: Secularism, Nationalism, Populism, Republicanism, Statism (Etatism), and 
Reformism. It should be noted that while each “arrow” is significant, their relative 
importance to the military and society varies over time. For example, Ataturk originally 
relied on the primacy of nationalism to develop the Turkish State. But since 1960 
secularism has become the chief component. “Kemalism is enshrined in the Turkish 
 
14 In his South American cases, Stepan recognized three areas for potential disputes between the 
military and the politicians in the 1980’s, namely human rights, the organizational arrangement of the 
military vis-à-vis the democratic government, and the military budget. Stepan, 68 and 111. 
15. Stepan, 93. 
16 Irtica means “reactionaryism” and is a negative term to describe the “Islamic fundamentalism.” 
Gunay, Niyazi. “Implementing the ‘February 28’ Recommendations: A Scorecard,” Research Note 10. 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. May 2001. Found on the web at: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/junior/note10.htm (Last accessed on 5 June 2005).  
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Constitution and includes a rigorous commitment to secularism, territorial integrity, and 
cultural integrity.”17 Those who question Kemalism are considered traitors.18 And while 
no one questions the overall philosophy, the components are fungible.19 The notion of 
statism, which symbolized a state run economy during the 1940s, evolved to mean a state 
planned economy during the 1960s and 70s. Statism as a principle decreased in 
importance during the late 1980s when Prime Minister Turgut Ozal introduced market 
reforms. 
Almost any disagreement between the military and the politicians can be framed 
in relation to one of the principles of Kemalism. Because of their close association to the 
Kemalist principles, the military becomes concerned when society’s interpretation of the 
principle strays too far from its own. To the elements of the military Generals, the rise of 
political Islam is viewed as a threat to secularism while Kurdish separatism contradicts 
the nationalist notion of territorial integrity. Membership in the EU represents another 
source of contention between the armed forces, society, and the civilian government at 
different periods of time. The military does not regard EU membership as necessary to 
the prosperity of the Turkish state. 
2. Sources of Power 
The EU Commissioner’s reports20 are “spot on” concerning the political influence 
of the Turkish military. The armed forces exert power through formal and informal 
means. Formal powers gained by the military are cemented in the institutions when the 
military “returned to the barracks.” Some examples of these institutions are the brief 
National Unity Commission (NUC) 1960; the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions; the National 
Security Council (MGK); the Armed Forces Assistance Funds (OYAK); and various 
working groups associated with the Turkish General Staff (TGS). 
In addition to the legal instruments of power, the armed forces derive legitimacy 
from  their  role  in  the  development  of  the Republic. The fact that the modern Turkish  
 
17 Jenkins, 7. 
18 Jenkins, 17. 
19 The concept of Kemalism can be summed up as a “commitment to progress.” 
20 These are the EU Commission’s Regular Reports on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession. 
Specifically I am referring to the regular reports on Turkey authored in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002.  
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Armed Forces (TAF) has never suffered a defeat contributes to the image of the military 
in society as Turkey’s most trusted institution. Finally, little boys in society are told that 
“every Turk is born a soldier.”21
3. The Relationship between Friction and Power  
When civil-military friction rises, the military’s political power increases only 
after an intervention by the armed forces. And when the political power becomes 
institutionalized, it serves an additional source of friction. As a result, the level of friction 
does not decrease when the military returns to the barracks. This has the effect of 
“ratcheting up” the civil-military friction after each intervention. This phenomenon 
makes civil-military friction behave “sticky upwards” meaning that once it is established, 
it cannot decrease without a preemptive decrease in the political powers of the armed 
forces. 
C. THE INTERVENING VARIABLE – THE COUP 
Political scientists have categorized the four interventions as either a 
“moderating” or “guardian” regime based upon Eric Nordlinger’s criteria describing 
military coup d'états.22 The difference between the two types of coups is the behavior of 
the military after the intervention. Acting as a moderating force, the military intervenes 
long enough in order to get the civilian government back on track. Turkey’s 1971 “coup 
by memorandum” and the “soft” coup of 1997 fit this category. In a guardian regime, the 
military replaces the civilian government with one more favorable to the military. 
Usually the guardian regime occupies power for only 2 to 4 years before returning 
governance to the civilians.23 The military takeovers of 1960 and 1980 are examples of 
guardian regimes.But this analysis is not enough. Since there is no predetermined level of 
friction which will trigger the takeover, it indicates that the decision to intervene is both 
rational and subjective. Intervention is a rational decision because the military 
understands the possible outcomes of the takeover and makes a decision based on a 
cost/benefit analysis between the status quo and the possible consequences. 
 
21 Jenkins, 13. 
22 Videt Knudsen, Birtel. (2005) “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics.” Unpublished paper 
from the Middle East Technical University. January 2005. and Hale, William. (1994) Turkish Politics and 
the Military. London: Routledge. 
23 Hale, William. (1994) Turkish Politics and the Military. London: Routledge. p. 300-310. 
8 
The subjective view of the military is important since it determines when to 
intercede. The act of intervention creates consequences that can hurt or help society and 
concurrently either hurt or help the military as an institution. In other words, the decision 
to intervene represents a preference by the military where it can “do good” or “do well.” 
Doing “good” means supporting the Turkish State by upholding the Kemalist principles 
and maintaining stability in society. Doing “well” represents a preference by the military 
to promote its own corporate interests and status. The ideal situation for the military is 
when it can do “good” and “well” at the same time. The Turkish Armed Forces perfected 
the coup d'état but the decisions of when and how to intervene were not taken lightly. The 
armed forces were successful at doing “good” and “well” from 1960 to 1980. The “soft” 
coup of 1997 became the exception. In this case, the military neither achieved “good” for 
society nor did “well” in furthering its own interests. 
Chapter II summarizes Turkey’s four military interventions using the friction, 
coup, and power framework. It concludes by showing how the status of civil-military 
relations moved further away from the ideal of democratic civilian control. Chapter III 
highlights the external factors which sustained Turkey’s pattern of civil-military relations 
during the Cold War and how Turkey’s pattern became no longer acceptable afterwards. 
Chapter IV details how EU-Turkey negotiations reversed the pattern of civil-military 
relations in Turkey. Finally, Chapter V identifies four scenarios for the future of Turkey’s 
civil-military relations depending on whether or not the EU and Turkey remain engaged 
in accession talks. 
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II. A SUMMARY OF THE INTERVENTIONS 
Reviewing the history of each of the four interventions in the friction, coup, 
power framework shows how the military became the most powerful actor in Turkish 
politics. It also highlights the similarities between the interventions. While none of the 
coups were executed exactly the same, they were all well received by Turkish society. By 
1980, the coup d'état became a legitimate domestic political instrument. However, by 
1997 that would change. 
A. FRICTION, COUP, POWER – 1950-1961  
1. Friction 
Turkey transitioned to multiparty politics between 1945 and 1950. While this 
evolution was an important step forward for democracy, it precipitated friction between 
the military and politicians. The details of the transition are important for three reasons. 
First, it illustrates the strong relationship between the military and the conservative 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Parti--CHP).24 Although the military was 
technically politically neutral it was closely aligned with and favored the CHP through 
the 1970s. Second, it highlights how differently the political parties viewed the armed 
forces role in society. Thirdly, the events set into motion the military coup of 1960 which 
forever damaged civil-military relations in Turkey.25  
Prior to 1950, civil-military friction in Turkey was virtually nonexistent. At the 
end of World War II, Turkey was ruled under martial law. It also helped that the 
President, former pasha Ismet Inonu, was widely respected by the military.26 Beginning 
in 1946 the Demokrat Parti (DP) emerged behind the leadership of former CHP 
members. Initially this was not perceived as a threat by the armed forces because they 
assumed the DP would possess similar beliefs about Kemalism. This was a logical 
 
24 The CHP was the political party founded by Ataturk. 
25 Videt Knudsen, 18. 
26 Taschau, Frank and Metin Heper. “The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey,” Comparative 
Politics, Vol 16, No. 1 (Oct. 1983), p. 20. 
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assumption since the leader, Celal Bayar, served as Prime Minister during Ataturk’s last 
government and formerly served as the economics minister in the 1930s.27
In 1946, President Inonu even supported the creation of an opposition party in 
order to show the West that Turkey was truly a democracy.28 Inonu reasoned that this 
image was important in order to maximize the monetary grants29 from the US under the 
Truman Doctrine.30 Besides being a matter of principle, democracy was also important 
for Turkey’s bid for NATO membership.31 But at the same time, Inonu did not intend to 
lose to the DP. Despite his success in calling for early elections the DP still won a 
number of seats in parliament. Though it was not enough to wrestle power away from the 
CHP, the tide would change in just four short years. 
In the 1950 elections, the DP surprised the CHP by gaining a solid majority in 
parliament that would last for the entire decade. The DP attained 59.3% of the vote while 
support for the CHP was less than 40%. The 19% difference in the popular vote 
translated into an overwhelming majority for the DP. As a function of the Turkish 
electoral laws the DP won 408 seats in Parliament versus the CHP’s 69. Voter turnout 
was close to 80%.32 The DP had its greatest support from the educated elite from the 
industrialized western portion of Turkey who expected the party to continue the current 
modernization process. The fact that the election produced the first President and Prime 
Minister who were not former military officers generated mild concern for the military.33 
Neither President Celal Bayar nor Adnan Menderes had any military experience. In fact, 
most of the DP representatives did not possess a military or bureaucratic background.  
Following the CHP’s electoral defeat in 1950, the military petitioned Inonu 
looking for guidance on whether or not they should intervene. Inonu declined the offer 
either due to a belief in the democratic system or because of a fear of having international 
 
27 Ozbudun, Ergun. (2000) Contemporary Turkish Politics. Boulder: Lynne Reinner. p.19 
28 A multiparty competitive political system was a requirement for NATO membership. Chapter II 
expands upon this issue. 
29 From 1947 until 1960 Turkey received approximately $3 billion in US. Weiker, 1. 
30 Zurcher, Erik J. (2004) Turkey: A Modern History. 3d ed. New York, NY: I. B. Taurius & Co. p. 
209. 
31 Turkey had competitive elections but was not a consolidated democracy. 
32 Zurcher, 221. 
33 Weiker, 20. 
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aid discontinued. The military hoped the DP would uphold the same attitudes towards the 
military as the CHP since the roots of the party sprang from the CHP.34 In recounting the 
aftermath of the election, General Kenan Evren told this story about actions of the 
General Staff. 
Nuri Yarmut [the new chief of staff]…collected all the officers in a garden 
behind the General Staff headquarters and told them that the government 
had gone over to a democratic system; they were to carry on with their 
jobs and not to interfere in politics. Basically most of the officer corps, 
especially the young officers, were pleased with the result. Those unhappy 
were mostly the elderly and those with strong links to the past.35  
It did not take long for civil-military relations to sour. Ironically, the “young 
officers [who] were pleased with the [electoral] result” would become part of the 
machine responsible for the first intervention in 1960.  
Shortly after taking office, the DP made it well known that the military “carried 
no weight in the [political] decision-making process.”36 The new leadership distrusted the 
military because of their close relationship to Inonu. The Turkish General Staff was 
purged and the regime no longer guaranteed the military autonomy from political 
interference in its affairs.37 Two examples of this meddling are when Prime Minister 
Menderes interfered with the promotion systems of the armed forces and the Chief of 
General Staff (CGS) was subordinated to the Minister of National Defense (MND).38
The Menderes government refused to keep the military’s wages on par with the 
rising inflation rates during the economic downturn in the mid 1950s. As a historically 
privileged class, the soldiers now suffered the indignity of being known as gazozcular, or 
those who could only afford soft drinks, in the bars around Ankara.39 Not only had the 
military lost its access to the “pinnacle of power” but also its social status and prestige.40 
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As the real wages of the military failed to keep up with rising inflation opposition 
towards the DP grew within the military.  
In the same time period, Turkey was accepted as part of the NATO club. To some 
extent, the military viewed NATO membership as a threat to its sovereignty. “No longer 
was the protection of the country…a function of Turkish forces and their deployment”41 
The Turkish General Staff had to get used to a number of American military advisers. 
The necessity for the DP to distinguish itself from the CHP only increased civil-
military friction.42 The chasm between the two parties widened over the definition of 
secularism. One reason why secularism became and issue is because the Kemalist 
reforms of the 1930s had little positive effects for the worker in the field. From the 
peasant’s perspective, they were stripped of their religious traditions when the CHP 
imposed secularism on them. The masses did not understand why they were forced to 
abandon their Islamic traditions.43 Prime Minister Menderes capitalized on this sentiment 
and used religion to gain votes in the elections during the 1950s. Menderes even claimed 
that “Turkey is a Muslim State and it will remain so.”44 In response to these statements, 
the CHP accused the DP of using religion to buy votes. Even though the DP never 
attempted to “give Islam a greater role in government,” the CHP portrayed the DP as 
deserters of the Kemalist principles. In response the DP accused the CHP of being an 
atheistic party which implied it was a Communist party. This counter-accusation of 
atheism was not entirely true. The CHP defined secularism not as the separation between 
mosque and state, but as the “subjugation and integration” of Islam into the state 
bureaucracy.45 Both of these definitions were at odds with the military’s view that 
religion was to be kept out of the public places. As a result, the armed forces became 
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increasingly unhappy about the DP’s “infidelity” to the Kemalist principles.46 These 
events set the stage for the toppling of the Menderes government in 1960. 
2. The Coup d'État of May 27th 1960  
Before the events of May 27th, 1960, the civilian Demokratik Parti (DP) briefly 
assumed civilian control over the military but abused the relationship by reducing the 
social status and the economic well being of the military.47 What brought the military out 
of the barracks was Menderes’ attempt to return to authoritarian rule in order to maintain 
the power of the DP.48 More specifically, the trigger for the intervention was Menderes’ 
use of the armed forces to enforce martial law in Ankara and Istanbul in order to seize 
control over large scale student demonstrations on May 1st 1960.49 The military objected 
to being used in this fashion. Two days later, the Land Forces Commander, General 
Cemal Gursel was placed on “compulsory leave.”50 Ironically these events would 
generate significant consequences for Menderes. The same plans devised for the defense 
of Ankara to prevent further civil violence were used to oust the Prime Minister. General 
Gursel would become the leader of Turkey following the coup d'état. 
The 1960 coup d'état is commonly called the “Colonel’s” coup since it was 
planned and executed by 37 officers from within the ranks of the military as opposed to 
being ordered by the Chief of General Staff. The older, more senior officers did not 
participate in the takeover either because they stayed loyal to the Menderes regime or 
simply failed to understand the dissent within the army. The fact that the coup started 
within the ranks of the military and bypassed the traditional chain of command would 
have  an  impact  on the subsequent interventions. The armed forces became exceedingly  
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concerned with the sentiments of the junior officers. In contrast to 1960, the coups of 
1971, 1980, and 1997 would be executed with the authority from the highest levels of the 
military command. 
The perpetrators of the takeover accused the Menderes government of “abolishing 
all individual and human rights, freedoms and immunities” as well as “establishing a 
single party dictatorship.”51  Tanks rolled into the streets while the army took the 
President and Prime Minister into “protective custody” and announced the end of the 
Menderes government.52 The military justified its actions to the public and the 
international community as necessary to prevent the perversion of the democratic system 
and Kemalism.53 As a military operation the execution was perfect. It took only 4 hours 
to establish military control.54
In order to add legitimacy to the May 27th coup, the leaders solicited the support 
of General Cemal Gursel. It was thought that a general officer of his stature was needed 
to discourage splinter groups within the armed forces from attempting their own 
countercoup. After all, military officers understood the difference between a coup and a 
mutiny. The former Land Component Commander was an easy leadership choice since 
he was well respected within the military and was only forced to retire a few weeks prior. 
In his last speech before he was placed on leave, Gursel warned his troops about the 
“greedy political atmosphere now blowing through the country.”55 In his first speech 
after the takeover, Gursel stated the purpose of the intervention was to “bring the country 
with all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy.”56 Ironically, as a General who was 
outspoken against the politicization of the military, Gursel would become the first 
President of Turkey’s Second Republic. 
The purpose of the takeover was to revamp Turkey’s political structure and 
prevent another “Menderes type” government. Once accomplished, the military was 
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committed to transition back to civilian rule. But the post-coup ruling period proved 
much tougher than expected.  
3. Power – The NUC, OYAK, and the MGK 
In the post-coup period, three instruments of power emerged that would shape the 
future of Turkey’s domestic politics. The first was the National Unity Committee (NUC) 
that acted as the interim government for 17 months. By way of the NUC, the military 
directed the development of the new Constitution to replace the one created in 1924. The 
second institution established after the rebellion was the Armed Forces Mutual 
Assistance Fund (OYAK). It is a retirement fund for the military officers and civil 
servants whereby each member contributes 10% of their monthly wages in return for a 
retirement pension.57 By providing an extra source of money, OYAK was an effective 
way for the military to remain independent from the whim of the politicians. The final 
institution was the National Security Council (MGK) which granted the military a legal 
voice in politics. The MGK initially started as an advisory board but became the primary 
means through which the military could thrust its policies on the government. There were 
several failed attempts to challenge the authority of the MGK during the late 1980s and 
90s. The only successful challenge would come from the European Union. 
a. The National Unity Committee 
The National Unity Committee (NUC) was a temporary institution to 
administrate the functions of government. It was composed of the 37 officers who 
originally planned the takeover. The takeover was met with passive acquiescence by the 
public.58 Keenly aware of its reputation in the eyes of society and the international 
community the military promised a speedy return to civilian rule. But before the military 
would relinquish control it tried to remove the sources of friction. First, the committee 
outlawed the DP and forbade any new political party to invoke its platforms or 
ideologies. However, that strategy failed since the spirit of the DP would be reborn in the 
Justice Party (JP) led by Suleyman Demirel. Second, the military sought to provide a new 
Constitution for the Republic that would “plug the holes that Menderes tried to use in 
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order to return to authoritarianism.”59 But the problem was not the document; it was the 
fact that Menderes violated the old Constitution. The new Constitution was carefully 
worded to prevent politicians from returning to authoritarian rule. In the end it provided 
the armed forces with more avenues to legally intervene in politics.60 Thirdly, 5,000 
officers considered ‘radical’61 by the NUC were purged from the military ranks. This 
indicates how concerned the interim leadership was about a countercoup. 
As an instrument of government the NUC was hindered by a feud within 
the organization concerning the appropriate length of time to maintain military control. 
Fourteen radical officers of the NUC wanted to maintain military rule indefinitely while 
the moderate majority was determined to keep their promise and return control to the 
civilians as soon as possible. The firing of 147 professors by the radical faction of the 
NUC was the trigger which led to the dismissal of “The Fourteen.”62
Just one day after the coup, the NUC appointed a cabinet composed of 15 
civilian officials and 2 military officers to determine the most important matters requiring 
attention. Within two months the cabinet listed 15 critical areas. Most of the items 
concerned economic reforms. A significant critique of the Cabinet was that it was just a 
façade for the military to run the government. Interviews conducted by Walter Weiker 
with the members of the NUC indicate that the former members listed education, literacy, 
and land reform as the three most important issues facing Turkey. Only 4 of the 37 
members considered religion a problem. This calls into question just how much 
Menderes’ courting of the devoutly religious population played in the decision to 
intervene. The motives for the coup become more suspicious when the same interview 
process by Weiker uncovered that planning for the coup extended all the way back to 
1955.63. What this suggests is that Menderes’ attempted return to authoritarianism 
provided the opportunity to legitimize the coup in the eyes of society and the 
international community At the end of the NUC’s 17 month rule, not only had the 
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military ended up with significantly more power to legally intervene in politics. The 
armed forces had also gained better pay and benefits for its officers. 
The committee also supervised the development of the new Constitution.64 
To accomplish this, the NUC created the Constituent Assembly in January of 1961. The 
composition of the 296 man assembly included the entire NUC and members appointed 
by Gursel and the CHP. While the composition of the assembly seemed to indicate a 
return to civilian control, the number of CHP representatives in the council gave the 
impression that the transition back to democracy would mean a return to rule by the CHP 
and Ismet Inonu. 65
The 1961 Constitution granted a number of political powers to the 
military. The document returned the Chief of the General Staff directly under the 
direction of the Prime Minister instead of the Minister of National Defense. This 
effectively gave the Chief of General Staff more powers. 
The Constitution also protected the outcome of the coup d'état by deeming 
that all laws adopted by the NUC were immune to judicial review. While other norms and 
conditions were subject to review by the judicial branch, the changes made by the 
military were not because they were granted a privilege incompatible with the supremacy 
of the Constitution.66 The 1961 Constitution also established the constitutional court, the 
State Planning Organization, the autonomous State Radio and Television Agency and 
universities, and the Council of State.67 After the NUC disbanded a number of the 
participants became Senators in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.68 In the transition 
from an authoritarian regime to democracy, the military left itself with ‘exit clauses’ that 
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b. OYAK 
The Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (OYAK) was established as a 
retirement account for military officers and civil servants. Each contributes 10% of their 
income to the OYAK fund. The unintended consequence was that OYAK is now one of 
the most dominant financial institutions in Turkey. They have expanded their investments 
into various sectors with joint ventures such as OYAK-Renault in the automobile 
industry.70 In addition to providing a pension, sources interviewed indicate that OYAK is 
also a chief employer of retired military officers and their families. Unlike Western 
democracies, the military is not dependent on the civilian government for financial 
support. 
c. The National Security Council (MGK) 
Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution created the National Security 
Council. The purpose of the institution was to “recommend to the Council of Ministers 
the necessary basic guidelines regarding the coordination and the taking of decisions 
related to national security” [italics added].71 Through the years, the organization began 
to see itself as the protector of economic, territorial, and political interests as well as the 
protector of Kemalism.72 One of the important tasks attributed to the MGK is the 
National Security Policy Document (NSPD) which defines the main threats to Turkey’s 
national security and sets the guidelines for security policy. Unlike Western democracies 
such as the United States and Great Britain, there is no parliamentary oversight of this 
document in Turkey. Nor does anyone inside the Council of Ministers (unless they 
occupy a place in the MGK) have an input into the document’s creation.73
Until the summer of 2003, the MGK consisted of the Chief of General 
Staff, the four Chiefs of the Armed Services, the General Secretariat, the President, Prime 
Minister, Foreign Minister and any ministers deemed necessary. The organization was 
authorized to make decisions regarding national security matters only. This eventually 
became an avenue for the military to influence the decision making process of civilian 
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governments. After the 1980 intervention, the military was able to dictate what those 
threats were. From the perspective of the military, the creation of the MGK was a rational 
decision to protect the state. If the military had more access to the civilian government, 
common sense would suggest that the need for another coup would disappear. This would 
prove not be the case and the evolution of the MGK would become the major instrument 
used by the General Staff to assert power over Turkey’s politicians. 
B. FRICTION, COUP, POWER – 1965 TO 1973 
1. Friction 
The 1960 coup failed to promote good governance or political stability.74 As a 
result, the underlying friction between the military and politicians was not resolved, only 
masked. The decade of the 1960s was marked by an increase in political violence brought 
on by both the left and right political factions. The Communist workers party which was 
outlawed in 1925 reincarnated itself in 1961 as the Turkish Workers’ Party.75 In 
response, the government established an ultra-right organization called the “Society for 
the Struggle against Communism” with Cemal Gursel as the honorary chairman. In 
addition, the “Grey Wolves” gained popularity as a right winged youth organization that 
eventually targeted leftist meetings.76 Communism was now an internal and external 
security threat to the Turkish State. The military perceived the political violence as a 
threat to the state as early as 1968. The government’s failure to quell the situation aided 
the military’s decision to intervene. By 1970, the senior military commanders already 
started refused to support the unpopular government.77  
2. March 12, 1971 
The military considered Prime Minister Demirel’s (JP) government too weak to 
maintain control in the face of rising political violence. Factions within the military 
started planning for their own interventions. Sensing the growing instability within the 
military, the National Security Council took action. The “memorandum” handed to Prime 
Minister Suleyman Demirel had two purposes. First, it insinuated the military would take 
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direct control of the government unless the government restored order and implemented 
reforms to return the Kemalist spirit.78
Parliament and the Government, through their sustained policies, views 
and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and 
social and economic unrest; made the public lose all hope of reaching a 
level of contemporary civilization, a goal set by Ataturk; failed to realize 
the reforms stipulated in the [1961] Constitution; and placed the future of 
the Turkish republic in grave danger.79  
Second, the memorandum was actually an attempt by the MGK to maintain unity 
within the armed forces and preempt another “Colonel’s coup.” Faced with the 
memorandum, the Demirel government resigned immediately. This may have been 
fortunate for Turkey since the MGK was unprepared to handle the crisis. It is most likely 
they would have ended up in a predicament similar to 1960 when it was uncertain how to 
run the government in the post-coup period. 
3. Power 
After Demirel’s resignation, the military selected a number of technocrats to run 
the country. By 1973 the government was handed back to the population. This only 
occurred after the military increased the power of the National Security Council in their 
favor. The influence of the MGK’s decisions over the Council of Ministers was 
strengthened. In the same time period, the Supreme Military Administrative Court was 
established and authorized to resolve administrative disputes concerned with the military 
authorities or military matters. The powers of the civilian Council of State were 
restricted. The State Security Courts were established and allowed some judges and 
prosecutors to be military officers. This opened a channel for the military to exercise 
significant power in the judicial process. The expenditures of the TAF were excluded 
from the judicial review of the Court of Accounts. The declaration of martial law was 
made easier which strengthened the overall power of the military. These changes to the 
Constitution magnified military’s influence in politics. As a result, Turkey’s CMR moved 
farther away from the ideal of civilian control. 
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C. FRICTION, COUP, POWER – 1975 TO 1982 
1. Friction 
Again, the 1971 intervention and resultant technocratic government did little to 
relieve the friction between the military and civilians. From 1973 to 1980, Turkey’s 
economy and political order were both crumbling while violence continued to rise. 
Parliament could not decide on a new President. The rift between the CHP and the JP 
widened. The CHP party leader, Bulent Ecevit, hated the leader of the JP, Suleyman 
Demirel. Furthermore, the National Salvation Party (NSP) which had indisputable 
Islamic ties was gaining popularity. The armed forces were indirectly affected by the 
political infighting which led to the imposition of martial law in 1978. In 1980, martial 
law was extended from 13 provinces to 20 provinces. Twenty-five percent of the armed 
forces were being used just to maintain civil order. This was a role not welcomed by the 
generals and was reminiscent of the environment in 1960.80 Additionally the political 
polarization that was taking place in society started to take root in the armed forces as 
well. The Turkish General Staff became worried about the number of Turkish cadets who 
were being expelled from the military academies because of their open religious beliefs. 
2. September 12, 1980 
This intervention is often referred to as the coup of the “reluctant generals.” The 
label implies that the military waited until the last possible moment giving the politicians 
every opportunity to resolve the crises. Alternatively it can be interpreted that the military 
waited until the conditions were right so it could act to “do good” for society and “do 
well” for it as own institution. Given the evidence leading up to the coup d'état, it is hard 
to accept the motives for the coup were entirely altruistic. 
Unlike May 27th operations, this takeover was executed with the permission and 
the support of the Chief of General Staff. General Kenan Evren, who was on active duty 
during the two previous interventions, understood the need to keep control of the middle 
ranked officers. By doing so he ensured the mistakes of the “Colonel’s coup” were not 
repeated. The first mistake was the late recognition of the fractions within the military 
made after the NUC was established. The second mistake was the lack of planning for the 
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post-coup regime. “We know what sort of (deplorable) situation the armed forces found 
themselves in 27 May. Should we repeat the same pattern?”81
There are two reasons attributed to the source of the coup. First, General Evren 
cites the failure of the Turkish parliament to come together and elect a President.82 
Alternatively, Kenneth Mackenzie regards the trigger for the coup to be the Konya rally 
on September 6th, 1980. The rally was organized by the rival National Salvation Party 
(NSP) and consisted of a gathering of “Islamic fanatics” who called for the introduction 
of Islamic Law (Shariat).83  
As a military operation, operation Black Flag was flawless. Like the coup in 
1960, there was little resistance. The takeover was bloodless and the junta was 
established without incident. By learning from the mistakes of 1960, the military’s 
planning for the post-coup government was much more thorough. The military, through 
the MGK, would successfully rule for Turkey for the next three years. 
3. Power  
The MGK dissolved the parliament and consolidated power in the hands of only 
the military members of its council.84 The next step undertaken by the MGK was the 
establishment of a new Constitution. In almost the same manner as in 1961, the MGK 
appointed a commission to write the new document which institutionalized many of the 
prerogatives gained by the military.85 The new Constitution increased the executive 
powers of the President and the MGK.86 As a result the Council of Ministers was now 
bound to “give priority consideration to their recommendations.” Article 118 of the 
Constitution was amended to reflect the new legal power vis-à-vis the politicians. 
Just as important as the changes to the Constitution was the passage of the 
National Security Council Law of 1983. Gareth Jenkins comments that the new NSC law 
defined national security in such broad terms that almost any subject could be considered 
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a “matter of national security.”87 The military could now define the threats and influence 
decisions on laws regarding those threats.88 This permitted the MGK to monopolize the 
defense sector.89 Additionally, the 1982 Constitution increased the military’s power by 
changing the structure of the courts. This had a compounding effect on the military’s 
prerogatives. Article 125 of the Constitution was changed to regulate judicial control over 
all administrative acts and actions. This weakened the rule of law by granting the military 
immunity from judicial review. 
D. FRICTION, COUP, POWER – 1993 TO 1997 
1. Friction 
The major sources of civil-military friction during the 1990s came from the rise of 
radical political Islam and Kurdish separatism.90 Not surprisingly the military considered 
these direct threats to the Kemalist principles of secularism and nationalism. The 
prerogatives granted by the Constitution after each coup reinforced the guardian image of 
the military and the MGK. 
The stakes were different in 1997. The Turkish Armed Forces which had kept 
Turkey on the road to Westernization and eventual EU membership became a roadblock 
to its own goals. At the same time the Turkey was engaged in a civil war in the 
southeastern portion of Anatolia against the PKK separatists. 1997 was the height of the 
war against the PKK which started in 1984.91 In addition the Turkish armed Forces were 
compelled to deal with the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Parti-RP) headed by 
the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. The RP came to power winning only 21% of the 
vote and relied on a weak coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party 
(TPP).92 One of the members of the MGK who oversaw the 28 February process said the 
following: “Nobody, for the sake of democracy, can look the other way when a party 
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attempts to set a state based on Islam even if that party obtained more than 50 percent of 
the vote…If necessary such a move would be obstructed in a non-democratic means.”93  
The Islamist leanings of Erbakan were unbearable for the military and the 
political elites. Starting with his campaign, Erbakan made disparaging remarks against 
NATO and EU membership. In one of his campaign speeches he claimed he wanted to 
create an “…Islamic NATO and an Islamic version of the EU.”94 With respect to foreign 
policy, Erbakan also embarrassed the armed forces during his overseas travels. This was 
evidenced by his association with Iran and by his visit to Libya in 1997. In a joint press 
conference with Muammar Qaddafi, the Colonel scolded Erbakan and the secular nature 
of Turkey as Erbakan sat quietly and failed to respond.95 The military was shamed by the 
Prime Minister’s failure to address the insults.  
Unlike the previous coups, the military had to weigh the decision to intervene 
against the possibility of ruining its chances for EU membership. This complicated the 
military’s decision. When the armed forces decided to act, they failed to do “good” for 
society or do “well.” 
2. February 28, 1997 
The “soft” coup was executed by the National Security Council during the routine 
monthly meeting. The council met with the Prime Minister for 9 hours and at the end of 
the meeting the MGK forced Erbakan to sign an agreement to implement 18 measures 
designed to stop the Islamization of society.96 The increase in political Islam was the 
official reason for the intervention, but during this period of the 1990s, almost every topic 
became a matter of friction between the politicians and the military. 
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The Prime Minister was rather taken aback by the demand of the MGK, but did 
not regard the situation as an immediate problem. He would later resign because he had 
lost credibility with his constituency as well as with the military. In order to expedite his 
removal, the military engaged in a public support campaign designed to reduce the 
legitimacy of the Erbakan government and the Refah Parti. This created quite a few 
results. First, Prime Minister Erbakan could not get any of the 18 demands passed 
through the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). This caused him such political 
embarrassment that he resigned four months later. Following Erbakan’s resignation, 
Mesut Yilmaz became the new Prime Minister and would carry Turkey through the 1997 
Luxembourg summit. By 2002 only 4 of the 18 recommendations were carried through.97 
Despite the removal of Erbakan and the eventual dissolution of the Refah Parti, Turkey 
still failed to gain EU candidacy. 
3. Power 
This “post modern” coup highlights the ultimate power of the National Security 
Council. At first glance it appears to mimic the 1971 “coup by memorandum,” but it was 
different because the military did not have to threaten a takeover. It was just the mere 
power of suggestion by the MGK that brought down the Prime Minister. Of particular 
note is that the MGK consisted of the same primary members, but the staff that supported 
the Secretariat General had grown to over 350 people.98 Another reason why the MGK 
executed so much power in the meetings was its ability to speak clearly and cogently on 
the topics for discussion. This is in contrast to the civilian ministers who were never as 
prepared as the military members of the council.  
The MGK and the Turkish General Staff created the Western Research Group 
(Bati Calisma Grubu – BCG) on the eve of the 1997 coup.99 This group was supposed to 
monitor potential political developments within Turkey and determine whether or not 
they were a threat to the Republic. Their Western Research Group’s focus after the coup 
became looking for signs of radical Islam. For example, the BCG looks for military 
 
97 Heper (2002), 6. 
98 Jenkins, 45. 
99 Heper (2002), 7. 
officers and politicians who stray from the principle of secularism. The Western Research 
Group also keeps files on people based on their religious practices. 
However, unlike the previous military interventions, the MGK actually lost power 
through a number of legal reforms. When the EU targeted Turkey’s National Security 
Council for reforms, this was a change to “business as usual” for the armed forces and an 
end to the pattern of civil-military relations. 
E. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
Based on the summary of events since 1960, Figure 2 shows how civil-military 
relations in Turkey progressed away from civilian control.100 At the same time, the 
diagram correlates the changes in friction and power with respect to the successful 
interventions by the military. This diagram demonstrates the pattern of Turkey’s civil-
military relations. The arrows between the coups are demonstrative of the relative 
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Figure 2. Turkey's Civil-Military Relations 1960-1997 
 
                                                 
26 
100 For a description of how this model was applied in Latin America, see Stepan, 122. 
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Rather than treating the four military interventions as discrete actions, this thesis 
asserts that the coup d'états are interrelated and that the seeds for each subsequent 
intervention since 1960 were planted by the outcomes of the previous coup. This pattern 
only masked the underlying friction between the military, politicians, and society while 
the armed forces continuously gained political power up until 1997. For example, the rise 
of political Islam, which defies the military’s definition of secularism and thus the 
concept of Kemalism, is cited as a reason for the first coup in 1960 as well as in 1980 and 
again in 1997. In addition, threats considered dangerous to the territorial integrity of 
Turkey such as the rise of communism and Kurdish separatism in the 1970’s, are used as 
explanations for military interventions in 1971, 1980, and 1997. 
Looking at democratic control of the armed forces (DCAF) as a function of civil-
military friction and the military’s political power unveils a distinct pattern in Turkey’s 
civil-military relations away from the ideal of civilian control. This shows that while 
Turkey was attempting to become more Western, its democracy was becoming less 
liberal. This happened during the Cold War and while Turkey was a reliable NATO 
member. The movement away from civilian control continued until 1997 when the 
pattern ended. The cycle ended because the rules of the game were changed by the 
security environment after the Cold War. Turkey’s ability to execute a coup d'état as an 
instrument of domestic policy, even if it was non-violent and “post modern,” was deemed 
no longer acceptable to the international community. Chapter III investigates the external 
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III. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Turkey’s domestic pattern of civil-military relations from 1960 to 1997 
demonstrated how the military became the most powerful actor in politics. Even though 
the country returned to democracy after short periods of authoritarian rule, the character 
of civil-military relations moved farther away from the ideal of democratic civilian 
control. One reason why this occurred was because the collective security during the 
Cold War fostered a permissive environment that allowed the Turkey’s armed forces to 
intervene without sanction. As long as the international community turned a blind eye to 
the interventions by the Turkish Armed Forces, it legitimized the coup d'état in the eyes 
of the Turkish society. This pattern lasted until 1997 when the EU issued a “No” decision 
regarding Turkey’s candidacy. Subsequent EU reports forced Turkey to reevaluate its 
civil-military relations. 
Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the European Economic Community 
(EEC) during the Cold War created expectations about its future in each organization. 
Turkey approached each institution differently. NATO was viewed as the primary 
alliance essential for collective security while the EEC was viewed as purely an 
economic alliance. Each association had its own set of standards and Turkey was able to 
negotiate with both until the mid-1990s when the values of NATO and the EU 
converged. 
At the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, Turkey assumed it was on the fast track for 
candidacy. Instead five former communist nations, and Cyprus, were chosen. The official 
reason for the snub was because of Turkey’s use of torture. This clearly indicated that 
having democratic practices and a signed Customs Union with the EU were no longer 
sufficient for membership. Now the quality of democracy became important. In addition 
to human rights, another measure associated with the quality of democracy is the concept 
of democratic civilian control of the armed forces (DCAF). While not specifically stated 
in the “Copenhagen Criteria” of 1993, democratic civilian control of the military has 
become the EU standard. 
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This chapter begins with a discussion about Turkey’s relationship with the NATO 
and the European Community (EC) during the Cold War. These experiences shaped 
Turkey’s expectations about its future as an EU member. The second part of this chapter 
explains that when the Turkish MGK made the decision to intervene in politics in 1997 it 
assumed it was making a decision compatible with its experiences during the Cold War 
and miscalculating the international reaction. Finally, this chapter concludes by 
explaining how a shift in the theory of civil-military relations changed the rules. 
A. SHAPING EXPECTATIONS 
1. Turkey’s Relationship with NATO 
While today Turkey has been called the “epicenter” of NATO, it must be 
remembered that its membership in the Alliance was not a foregone conclusion.101 
Turkey’s role in the post-WWII environment was debated among the victors. Britain 
wanted Turkey to play a major part in the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) 
while the United States preferred Turkey to participate in the Western Defense system.102 
The impetus for bringing Turkey into NATO was the Soviet annexation of Eastern 
Europe.103 Still, reservations about Turkey’s “Europeaness,” religion, geography, and its 
benefit to European security emerged. In spite of the debates, Ankara joined NATO in 
1952 after two years of lobbying the alliance. Some of those same arguments have been 
reincarnated to fuel current debates about Turkey’s membership in the EU.  
Turkey has remained a reliable NATO member since its accession104 through a 
commitment of its large standing army and acting as a buffer zone. The strategic value of 
Turkey’s geography is obvious considering how NATO expected Turkey to counter a 
Russian invasion. Turkey was supposed to engage a Soviet onslaught from the East, fight 
 
101 Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop. “NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit: Charting the Alliance’s Ongoing 
Adaptation to 21st Century Risks and Challenges” Turkish Policy Quarterly. Vol 3, No 2 (Summer 2004) 
p. 13. 
102 William Hale, review of The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman 
Doctrine and Turkey’s NATO Entry Contained the Soviets, by George McGhee, British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1991): 259-260. 
103 Barchard, David. (1994) “Turkey and the European Union” Working Draft of a future pamphlet 
for the CER, p. 52. Available on the web at: 
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/lecturesarchive/SEESP%20turkey%20report.pdf  
104 Turkey has been a true NATO ally. Not necessarily a consistent US ally. Incidents such as the 
Johnson Letter in 1964 discouraging Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus; the arms embargo by the US after 
Turkey’s intervention in 1974; and disagreements over the role Turkey would play in the 1991 Gulf War 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom have strained US and Turkish relations. 
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and retreat long enough for NATO to execute a counter offensive. To put it another way, 
Turkey was expected to trade territory for time.105 In return, NATO provided Ankara a 
vehicle for military modernization as well as security. Beyond merely supplying modern 
military equipment, NATO and particularly the United States invited Turkey to 
participate in joint education and training programs. Additionally, Turkey was afforded 
protection under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. This was important to the Republic of 
Turkey to alleviate the fear that no country would come to its aid if Greece attacked.106
While NATO proved to be effective during the Cold War, it was not without its 
ideological contradictions. NATO cultivated the appearance of an alliance of 
democracies but that was not always the case.107 Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Turkey all 
wavered between authoritarian regimes and democracy during their membership.108 
Portugal was a non-democratic state when it originally joined NATO in 1949. To join the 
alliance, it was sufficient for Lisbon to simply sign a protocol stating it would “defend 
Western democratic ideals.”109 Turkey’s membership was tied to the development of a 
competitive political system but not necessarily a consolidated democracy.110 Greece and 
Turkey both faltered between authoritarianism and democracy as the other alliance 
members turned a blind eye.111 This indicates that the domestic political makeup of the 
member countries was not as important as their allegiance to the West and NATO. 
Democracy may have been an articulated condition for membership, it was not enforced. 
Despite Athens’ and Ankara’s transgressions, NATO elected not to impose significant 
 
105 Hickok, Micahel Robert. (2000) “Hegemon Rising: The Gap Between Turkish Strategy and 
Military Modernization,” Parameters, Summer 2000, p.118. Found on the web at: http://carlisle-
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Proposed New Members,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 297. Washington DC, March 1998. 
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109 Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO. “Learning from past experience of admitting 
new members into NATO,” Washington, D.C.. Available on the web at: 
http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/index.html (Last accessed on 7 June 2005). 
110 Hale, 95. 
111 This was not the case regarding Cyprus. NATO was very aware and concerned about the 
appearance of two allies fighting against each other. Particularly because it made the Alliance look appear 
weak in the international community. For this reason, NATO and the United States sanctioned Turkey after 
the 1974 incursion into Cyprus. 
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consequences – such as expulsion—on either country. The willingness of the 
international community to ignore Turkey’s domestic politics created the permissive 
environment in which Turkey’s civil-military relations pattern of friction, coup, and 
power was tolerated. This can be demonstrated by the international reactions to Turkey’s 
military interventions.  
The inner workings of Turkey’s government during the Cold War were important 
to Washington only as far as they contributed to the NATO’s stability. Stability meant 
security which trumped democracy. In 1960, the first coup d'état came as a complete 
surprise to the United States.112 But since the perpetrators’ intentions were in the interest 
of stability rather than self-aggrandizement, the United States was contented that Turkey 
would remain pro-Western and Pro-US. President Kennedy was quoted as saying “[t]he 
coup proves that the military can not only protect a nation, but also build a nation.”113 
This implicit approval of Turkey’s military actions contradicts the Western concept of 
civilian control of the military and demonstrates that stability was valued more than 
democracy. 
The 1971 coup evoked little response from the international community other 
than a brief acknowledgement from President Nixon that he supported the coup. This was 
most likely because this was not an armed intervention and could easily be justified as 
necessary to maintain stability. The 1971 intervention failed to halt the domestic situation 
from sliding into chaos during the 1970s. By the end of the decade Turkey was deemed 
the weakest member of NATO because of its potential to become an Islamic state.114 The 
weakening of Turkey was interpreted as a weakening of the alliance. This concern was 
amplified by international events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
American hostage crisis in Iran. According to the mastermind of the coup, General Evren, 
the United States wanted the Turkish Armed Forces to intervene in order to maintain 
stability  in  the  Middle  East.115  In  his  book  The General’s  Coup in Turkey: an Inside  
 
112 Weiker, 160. 
113 Weiker, 22. 
114 Birand, Mehmet Ali. (1987) The General’s Coup in Turkey: an Inside Story of 12 September 1980. 
Translated by M. A. Dikerdem. London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, p. 185. 
115 Demirel, 260-264. 
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Story of 12 September 1980, author Mehmet Ali Birand describes three additional 
instances where the United States administration either explicitly or implicitly supported 
the coup d'état in 1980.116
While the Turkish military claims that it only gets involved in subjects pertaining 
to national security, the definition of national security has been expanding. The 1997 
National Security Policy Document (NSPD) not only included the internal and external 
threats to the State, but also the threats to Kemalism. Since the Council of Ministers is not 
privileged to the NSPD process and it is produced without civilian supervision or 
approval, Turkey finds itself in a civil-military situation where “no one is guarding the 
guardians.” 
The success of the Turkish Armed Forces and the regional stability of Turkey 
validated this mentality during the Cold War. There was no reason for Turkey to change 
its procedures or structural relationship. NATO did not require, or at least ignored, 
civilian control of the military in the case of Turkey and at the same time, the Generals 
would not give up their powers.  
2. Turkey’s Relationship with the EU Prior to 1997 
Turkey formally applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 
partly because the Greeks had already submitted an application. In the same manner in 
which Turkey considered NATO as a military alliance, it viewed the EEC (and later the 
EU) as nothing more than economic association.117 Nowhere in the original agreement 
did the quality of Turkey’s democracy appear. The theory was that association based on 
economic ties would foster democracy over time.118 The arrangement between Turkey 
and the EC was intended to culminate with a Customs Union after Turkey complied with 
a number of intermediate integration stages. One of the stages was the Ankara 
Association Agreement signed in 1963. Article 2 of the Ankara Agreement states: 
 
116 For a detailed description of events see Birand, The General’s Coup in Turkey: an Inside Story of 
12 September 1980, 126-127, 172-196. 
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118 Borzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse (2004) “One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of 
Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law,” Unpublished paper prepared for the International 
Conference “Thirty Years of Third Wave Democratization: Paradigms, Lessons, and Perspectives” at the 
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), December 10-111, 2004. p. 1- 4. 
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The aim of this Agreement is to promote the continuous and balanced 
strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while 
taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the 
Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the living 
conditions of the Turkish people.119  
Ten years later Turkey signed a protocol that reduced the trade barriers on 
Turkish goods in Europe and furthered the hope of establishing a Customs Union by 
1995.120 In the meantime, President Turgut Ozal submitted Turkey’s first application for 
full membership to the European Community in 1987. By all accounts that package was 
haphazardly put together and hastily tendered. The EU was shocked by the application 
and took two years to formally reply to the request with a qualified no. 
In the 1989 decision, the Commission reaffirmed Turkey’s eligibility for eventual 
membership and recommended Turkey try again after 1995 once Ankara addressed some 
practical measures.121 These items included: the completion of a Customs Union with the 
EU; resumption of financial cooperation including access to EU risk capital and the 
disbursement of the Fourth Financial Protocol;122 the promotion of industrial and 
technological cooperation and the strengthening of political and cultural links.123 The 
decision preceded the development of the “Copenhagen Criteria” and therefore, there was 
no mention of Turkey’s civil-military relations or the quality of its democracy. The 
Commission’s decision reinforced the belief that the EEC was only concerned with 
economics.  
In what appeared to be a significant leap towards membership, Turkey signed the 
Customs Agreement with the EU in 1995. Prime Minister Tansu Ciller was relentless in 
her quest to push through the agreements. She argued her case to the European Union 
warning that if that if Turkey did not get into the EU it would open the door for Muslim 
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fundamentalism.124 The Customs Union had the potential to be a success. According to a 
World Bank report in May 1996, Turkey could expect a 1-1.5% increase in GDP from the 
Customs Agreement if Turkey included a value added tax (VAT).125 Instead, the 
agreement resulted in an asymmetric balance of trade in favor of the EU. Since Turkey 
failed to implement the VAT it created a significant loss of tax revenue.126 However, the 
Customs Union was viewed as a means to an end and the terms of the agreement were 
irrelevant. It was regarded as only a formality to expedite EU membership 
negotiations.127 In the minds of the Turkish elites, fulfilling the Customs Union was 
equivalent to full EU membership.128 This would not be the case. 
B. 1997: A CLASH OF EXPECTATIONS 
The end of the Cold War redefined the security challenges for NATO. The 
Alliance shifted from being the quintessential manifestation of a true “balance of power” 
instrument into a conduit for democratic peace theory. The disintegration of the Soviet 
Union led many political scientists to predict NATO would also quickly disappear. As an 
institution, NATO had to transform to ensure its survival. Instead of dissolution, NATO 
embarked on a policy of expansion. This was due in part to the liberal belief that security 
could be assured through economic and political integration between democratic nations. 
That philosophy, energized by President Clinton’s desire to absorb some of the former 
Eastern Bloc nations into NATO by 1999, gave the alliance a new raison d’etre.129
As NATO’s theories about security changed, so did the EU’s requirements for 
applicant nations. The European Parliament added a set of political criteria known as the 
Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. Countries seeking EU membership would have to meet the 
following requirements:  
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1) The Candidate State has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; 
2) The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; 
3) The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence 
to the aims of political economic and monetary union.130  
Leading up to the Luxembourg summit, Turkey marketed itself based on the Cold 
War rationale emphasizing its stability and economic prosperity rather than the fully 
complying with the Copenhagen Criteria. As a result, Ankara’s main platform for 
membership relied on the following: 
1) Turkey already had a long standing Association Agreement signed in 
1963.  
2) Turkey argued they were economically on par with or more advanced than 
the other former [Communist economy] applicants and that its 
parliamentary democracy was much more established; 
3) Turkey offers a strategic and economic advantage in terms of protecting 
the southern flank of the Europe as well as being a gateway to the 
emerging countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia regions; 
4) Turkey argued its application was crucial to Europe’s future relations with 
the Islamic south of the Mediterranean. Cold shouldering of the secular 
and democratic Turkish republic would signal that the EU was a ‘Christian 
club,’ this would only increase the rift between the Christian north and the 
Islamic south in the Mediterranean region.131 
It also seemed as if Turkey expected the decision on the Luxembourg round of 
expansion would follow the logic of the previous Mediterranean expansions which 
included Greece, Spain, and Portugal. None of these nations met all the elements of the 
Copenhagen Criteria but were allowed to join anyway. Instead, the intergovernmental 
conference in December of 1997 granted five former Warsaw Pact nations plus Cyprus 
candidate status and passed on Turkey.132 This “slap in the face” by the EU Commission 
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was due in part to a clash of expectations. Luxembourg’s Prime Minister, Claude 
Juncker, issued the decision on behalf of the EU summit saying "It cannot be that a 
country where torture is still practiced has a place at the European Union table."133 While 
the EU officially cited Turkey’s use of torture as the main reason for denying 
membership, it was really about the quality of Turkey’s democracy. As previously 
mentioned, Turkey expected to gain candidate status because it had fulfilled what it 
presumed were the requirements outlined in the EU’s decision in 1989. The EU, on the 
other hand, expected Turkey to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. Of concern to the 
EU were Turkey’s human rights, the situation in southeastern Anatolia and Islamic 
fundamentalism.134 In addition, the Europeans questioned the democratic nature of a 
country that could suppress an entire political party which Turkey had done after each 
intervention.135 The rules for membership had changed. Having a procedural democracy 
was no longer good enough for admission into the “club.” Now the emphasis was on the 
quality of democracy of which human rights and civil-military relations are more 
significant than just competitive political elections.  
1. The Fallout from the Luxembourg IGC 
According to the 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards Accession, Turkey reacted negatively to the Luxembourg decision. 
Prime Minister Yilmaz claimed that Turkey received discriminatory treatment136 
compared with the other applicant countries and as a result, Ankara would no longer 
participate in the European Conference process. Turkey suspended its political dialogue 
with the Union. Therefore, Turkey no longer wished to discuss issues such as relations 
between Greece and Turkey, Cyprus or human rights. From Ankara’s perspective, EU-
Turkey relations would be based only on the existing texts of the Customs Union. 
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The “No” decision handed out at the Luxembourg conference did not immediately 
result in a change in Turkey’s civil-military relations. It was only after a series of regular 
EU reports regarding Turkey’s progress towards accession that the topic of civil-military 
relations was addressed. When the EU became involved, it immediately targeted the 
National Security Council for reforms. The reason why the EU was so specific about the 
reforms was due to a parallel shift in the theory of civil-military relations. 
C. CHANGE IN THE THEORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The shake up of the international status quo after 1991 had a profound effect on 
the concept of democratic control of the armed forces (DCAF). There was no change to 
the philosophy that civilians should control the armed forces, but the end of the Cold War 
led to different theories on how this should be done. The dominant theory during the Cold 
War asserted that maximizing military professionalism would lead to civilian control of 
the military.137 In some ways Huntington’s definition of civilian control was tautological. 
For example, his definition of professionalism meant the military would accept 
subordination to its civilian government. However, this is one of the characteristics of a 
professional army. For the Western nations the concept of civil-military relations seemed 
to be settled. The constant threat of the Soviet Union inherently led to a convergence of 
priorities for both the politicians and the armed forces. This common threat made it easier 
to achieve democratic civilian control of the armed forces. 
When the Warsaw Pact disbanded in the early 1990s, the central eastern European 
(CEE) nations faced a different problem. Their militaries were accustomed to civilian 
control, but only by authoritarian governments. Their armed forces had been politicized 
and routinely acted as instruments of the Communist political parties.138 This created a 
challenge for NATO. Not only did NATO have to find a way to absorb its former 
enemies, it also required them to accept democratic civilian control of their military. The 
problem that emerged following the Cold War was that the armed forces in the central 
and eastern European countries came to represent oppression instead of modernization. 
The lack of trust in the military during Communist rule and the cost of democratization 
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provoked the civilian governments of the CEE countries to slash military budgets and 
sacrifice the quantity and quality of their armed forces. 
As a solution, NATO focused on developing institutions to promote civilian 
control. This is what Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster consider 
the “first generation” issues of civil-military reform.139 These include the founding of 
institutions such as constitutional structures and the development of clear lines of 
responsibility between the military and the government.140 Like NATO, the EU tied the 
status of civil-military relations to membership. In order to comply with the requirements, 
the CEE countries adopted institutions with roles and missions based on the Western 
definition of civilian control. This new vision of civil-military relations meant that a 
country must not only possess civilian control of the military but it must “look European” 
as well. This was easier said than done. The immediate problem facing the CEE states 
was getting the institutions to work correctly. Even after 2000, it was evident that just 
because the institutions existed did not guarantee civilian control. The next step was to 
ensure the institutions worked properly. The new theory of civil-military relations, the 
regime theory, regarded civilian control as a process. It also acknowledged that the 
military should occupy a significant position in the defense decision making process.141 
The new theory regarding democratic civilian control of the armed forces required 
“principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge.”142 Simply having the institutions was no longer sufficient. 
The CEE countries benefited from the establishment of new institutions and the 
guidance from NATO under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. On the other hand, 
this analysis created a problem for Turkey. The National Security Council (MGK) had 
become the dominant institution in Turkey’s politics. It was also the main instrument 
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though which the military could impose its political will. In order to meet the political 
requirements for admission into the EU, Turkey would have to dismantle the very 
institution that kept the nation on track for Westernization over the last 40 odd years.  
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IV. REVERSING THE DOMESTIC PATTERN 
This chapter explains how the EU-Turkey negotiations after the 1997 
Luxembourg summit led to the approval of Turkey’s 7th “Harmonization” legislation 
package. These reforms, passed in the summer of 2003, were formulated to reduce the 
political influence of the generals and establish democratic civilian control. This task was 
forced upon Turkey when civilian control of the military became tied to its EU 
membership bid. In its regular reports, the European Union specifically cited the form 
and function of the National Security Council (MGK) as a barrier to democratic civilian 
control of the armed forces. This obligated Turkey to make significant changes to the 
council which convened at least once per month from 1961 until 2004. 
Trying to establish civilian control over the armed forces was different in Turkey 
than in either the central and eastern European (CEE) countries or the Mediterranean 
nations of Portugal, Greece, and Spain. One reason is because the history of the armed 
forces matters. The military played an important role in the development of the Turkish 
State and occupied an esteemed position in society. During Communist rule, the military 
in the CEE nations represented oppression and stagnation. In the Mediterranean states, 
the armed forces did not play as important a role in the development of these countries 
compared with Turkey. As a result, promoting DCAF in these nations was a matter of 
building effective institutions. Once built, DCAF was expected to follow. Turkey, on the 
other hand, faced the opposite dilemma. It had to dismantle the military institutions 
which prevented DCAF. 
The solution seems quite simple. For Turkey to achieve civilian control of its 
armed forces, it should remove the military’s instruments of political power such as the 
MGK. A report to the European Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common 
Security and Defence Policy concluded:  
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…it will be necessary in the long term to abolish the National Security 
Council in its current form and position; …the desired structural change 
will be very hard [for the military] to swallow.”143  
The first part of this chapter details the different EU reports and decisions that led 
to the 7th Harmonization package. Excerpts from the regular EU reports and decisions 
provide insight into how the National Security Council was physically changed. The 
second part of this chapter explains how the reforms affected the character of Turkey’s 
civil-military relations by returning to the DCAF diagram developed in the first chapter. 
A. DISMANTLING THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
The friction, coup, power pattern of Turkey’s CMR and the attitudes of the 
international community towards Turkey during the Cold War created the permissive 
environment that legitimized the coup d'état as a tactic. 
The attempt to dismantle the National Security Council can be tracked in three 
stages. The first stage was discourse. This encompassed the development of “reports and 
retorts” between the European Commission and Turkey. Delving into the reports and 
Turkey’s responses, or lack there of, demonstrates the manner in which the EU expected 
Turkey to change. However, it was not until General Hilmi Ozkok became the Chief of 
the Generals Staff (CGS) that any substantive action occurred. General Ozkok’s selection 
as the CGS represented a step forward in Westernization and EU membership. Not only 
was he instrumental in championing the reforms to the MGK, but he had an important 
impact on the future of Turkey’s officer corps. He filled key positions with reformers and 
“retired” the hardliners.144 General Ozkok has been widely credited with the reforms. 
MEP Arie Oostlander, whose reports did not have a lot to praise for Turkey, referred to 
Ozkok as the “intelligent Supreme Commander.”145 The final stage of dismantling the 
MGK was the passage of the 7th Harmonization package. While the reforms were passed 
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), the legislation was actually developed 
at the executive level. When all is said and done, this was not “good governance” 
associated with democratic civilian control of the military, but rather a set of “exit 
 
143 Oostlander, Arie M. (2003) DRAFT REPORT on Turkey’s Application for Membership of the 
EU. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. March 2003. 
Available on the web at: http://www.oostlander.net/ (Last accessed on 7 June 2005). 
144 Ulsever, Cunyet (2003) “Thank you General Sarisik!” Turkish Column Attacks Left-Wing Writers, 
Ret. Generals for Opposing Change. Financial Times Information. Global News Wire, 28 Aug 2003. 
145 MEP Arie Oostlander, interview by author via e-mail, 27 May 2005. 
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criteria” for the military negotiated between the Prime Minister and the CGS.146 The 
changes made were the changes the military was willing to give up. 
1. Discourse 
The dialogue between the EU and Turkey on the subject of civil-military relations 
concentrated on the form and function of the MGK. Unlike the EU’s general comments 
about torture in Turkey, the European Union was specific about reducing the role of the 
generals in politics. The philosophy was that once the institutions were changed there 
would be a corresponding change in the function of the council. The EU published yearly 
regular reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession from 1998 to 2004. The 
information for the regular reports was gathered from voluntary sources from within the 
country, EU Parliament discussions, and member of European Parliament (MEP) 
Committee reports. These reports served as Turkey’s report cards. They measured how 
closely and efficiently Turkey implemented the suggestions outlined in the previous 
reports.147 One example of how the EU obtains its information is the Report on Turkey’s 
Membership of the EU. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common 
Security and Defense Policy delegated authority to a member of the European Parliament 
to conduct a fact finding mission in Turkey. The member from the European Parliament 
conducted interviews with representatives from universities, press, minority groups, 
politicians, religious representatives, etc. Only the military turned down the chance to 
meet with the MEP. The military explained that since it was above politics, it would not 
be appropriate to meet with the representative from the EU.148 The Draft Report on the 
subject released in March of 2003 brought severe critiques from the government of 
Turkey and its military. Of considerable controversy was the finding that Kemalism was 
not compatible with the EU standards. Due to the strong criticism, the statements 
 
146 MEP Arie Oostlander, interview by author via e-mail, 27 May 2005. 
147 For a detailed description of the reporting procedures, see 2000 Regular Report from the 
Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 8 November 2000. 
148 Report of Study visit of Arie Oostlander to Turkey. On Turkey’s Progress to EU Membership. 
Interviews conducted between 26-30 November 2002. Available on the web at: 
http://www.oostlander.net/rapporten/030314e.html (Last accessed on 2 June 2005).  
44 
                                                
regarding Kemalism were removed from the final report.149 The danger with conducting 
interviews is finding the right people to provide the information. In the realm of gathering 
information for negotiations, the adage “garbage in, garbage out” still applies.150  
The 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’ Progress 
towards Accession contained the first account of the status of Turkey’s civil-
military relations. On the role of the MGK in politics, the report stated… 
The existence of this body [MGK] shows that, despite a basic democratic 
structure, the Turkish constitution allows the Army to play a civil role and 
to intervene in every area of political life.151
The subsequent two EU regular reports criticized Turkey for its lack of progress 
towards achieving civilian control of the armed forces. The failure to do so was blamed 
on the existence of the MGK.152 The next yearly report echoed the same critiques and 
included the authority of the military courts as an additional roadblock to democracy. 
Through the National Security Council, the Military continues to have an 
important influence in many areas of political life. The National Security 
Council continues to play a major role in political life. While the 
emergency courts system remains in place, the replacement of the military 
judge by a civilian one in State Security Courts, represents a clear 
improvement in terms of independence of the judiciary.153
The 2000 Regular Report also issued a third warning regarding the lack of 
progress in achieving civilian control over the military. This report also questioned the 
alignment of the Turkish General Staff and the Defense Minister. Unlike the other 
European states, the TGS is not subordinate to the Minister of National Defense (MND). 
 
149 In an e-mail interview, Mr. Oostlander added that after he published his draft report in March of 
2003, he was visited by “people representing the huge military interests in enterprises [sic]. They tried to 
explain that these interests should be considered as the insurance association of the army!” MEP Arie 
Oostlander, interview by author via e-mail, 27 May 2005. 
150 Mr. Oostlander says he was careful whom he picked to interview and stated that he sought 
diversity in his interviewees. For his information regarding civil-military relations, he spoke with a number 
of “excellent” professors in Turkey. Interview by author via e-mail, 27 May 2005. 
151 Commission of the European Communities (1998), Regular Report 1998, from the Commission on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, p 14. 
152 Commission of the European Communities (1999), Regular Report 1999, from the Commission on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, p. 25. and 
Commission of the European Communities (2000), Regular Report 2000, from the Commission on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, p. 19-25. 
153 Commission of the European Communities (2000), Regular Report 2000, p. 10. 
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Instead the CGS and the MND share a relationship of close coordination. From this 
analysis, it appears each report is gathering more evidence in order to force a 
modification in the MGK’s role in Turkey’s politics. The 2000 document was also critical 
of the military’s influence in the Council of Higher Education. A member of the General 
Staff sits as a member of its board. The findings of this report deemed the role 
inappropriate for the military. 
Until March of 2001, the EU reports were non-binding and went without 
consequence. The important document that made civilian control of the military an 
important criterion was the EU Council of Minister’s decision concerning Turkey’s 
prospects for membership. The decision on 8 March 2001 determined that “improved 
relations between the military and the politicians were one of the medium term political 
requirements.” Over the next three years, Turkey would have to fulfill the Copenhagen 
Criteria for EU membership. The guidance in the report was crystal clear: 
Align the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an 
advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU 
Member States.154  
As part of the negotiation process for accession, Turkey responded with its own 
National Plan for the Acceptance of the Acquis Communautaire (NPAA) in 2001. The 
500+ page document, negotiated between the EU and Prime Minister Ecevit, has only 
two sentences dedicated to the subject of civil-military relations and the role of the MGK. 
The National Security Council, which is a constitutional body, has the 
status of a consultative body in areas of national security. Relevant articles 
of the Constitution and other legislation will be reviewed in the medium 
term to define more clearly the structure and the functions of this 
Council.155
This response was little more than an acknowledgement of the critiques outlined in the 
previous reports. It is interesting how this short, inconsequential paragraph evolved into 
the reform packages passed in July of 2003. 
 
154 Official Journal of the European Union, L 85/19. 
155 Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, and the Secretariat General for EU Affairs. Turkish National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, Ankara, p. 26. Available on the web at: http://www.abgs.gov.tr 
(Last accessed 7 June 2005).  
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The published 2001 regular report concluded that despite the change in the 
composition of the MGK, there has been “little sign of increased civilian control over the 
military.”156 This was also in spite of the powers granted to it in 1982 had been rolled 
back. 
In 2001 the composition of the NSC was changed to make the military 
members a minority. It also changed the stated role of the NSC reducing it 
to an advisory board rather than the powers it was given with the 1982 
constitution.157
The composition of the MGK made no difference in its function because of the strong 
informal power of the military according to Professor Umit Cizre of Bilkent University. 
In an unpublished interview between Dutch MEP Arie Oostlander and Professor Cizre 
stated “…it actually does not make any difference making the number [of civilians in the 
MGK] 100! The role did not diminish, as the role of the military has nothing to do with 
the institutional set up of the [MGK].”158 The amendment increased the number of 
civilians in the MGK to nine while the generals remained at five.  
The constitutional amendment introducing changes to the composition and 
role of the National Security Council has been put into practice. 
Nonetheless, these changes do not appear to have modified the way in 
which the National Security Council operates in practice.159
The reason why there was no change to the function of the organization is because 
the council makes its decisions based on consensus rather than by a majority vote.  
The period between 1998 and 2002 was filled with a lot of talk, but no action with 
respect to the role of the military in Turkey’s society. It was not until the appointment of 
General Ozkok to the position of CGS that action started. 
2. Action 
General Hilmi Ozkok took over the reins of the Turkish Armed Forces on August 
28th, 2002. However his ascension was not without a fight. The outgoing CGS, General 
Kivrikoglu tried to extend his own tenure for another year but was denied during the 
meeting of Turkey’s High Military Council held every August to determine the 
 
156 Commission of the European Communities (2001), Regular Report 2001, 16. 
157 Commission of the European Communities (2001), Regular Report 2001, 19 
158 Report of Study visit of Arie Oostlander to Turkey 26-30 November 2002. 
159 Commission of the European Communities (2002), Regular Report 2002, 138. 
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promotions and the positions of the highest ranking officers in the armed forces. Usually 
the promotion system follows a standard pattern. Historically, the former Land Forces 
Commander (KKK) becomes the new Chief of the General Staff when the latter retires. 
The new general replacing the outgoing KKK commander is expected to be next in line 
for the CGS position. In this meeting, the outgoing CGS tried to block Ozkok from the 
position. Since he could not stop the promotion, the Command of the Land Forces went 
to General Bukanyet who is a hard-lined ally with the outgoing CGS.  
General Ozkok, who has spent a great deal of his career outside Turkey, is viewed 
as a proponent of reforms in order to get into the EU. But at the same time, Ozkok made 
it clear that any departure from the principle of secularism could trigger a reaction from 
the military. So far during his watch, Turkey passed the 6th and 7th Harmonization 
packages which will be discussed in detail in the next section. One year after assuming 
command, Ozkok executed his own “mini purge” of the generals. At the conclusion of a 
three day meeting of the HMC, General Tuncay Kilinc, the MGK General Secretary was 
among those slated for retirement. His position was given to Lieutenant General Sukru 
Sariisik who was promoted to full General and moved from his command of the 5th Army 
Corps.160 This announcement came just days after the 7th Harmonization package was 
passed by the parliament but not yet approved by President Necdet Sezer. General Kilinc, 
and his Chief Adviser were outspoken critics of the changes to the MGK. General 
Agaoglu, adviser to the MGK Secretary, acknowledged the seventh harmonization 
package by-passed the MGK for comment. To him, this indicated the position of the 
Secretary General was abrogated and he was sure the entire MGK would “dissolve in 3 
months.”161 Press reports indicated a split in the military. According to K Gajenda Singh, 
India’s former Ambassador to Turkey, “[t]he armed forces are unhappy if not livid with 
 
160 “Army promotions announced; new security council head appointed.” BBC Worldwide 
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LexisNexis document. 
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the reform package” and its diminished role.162 Singh also seemed surprised that the 
politicians had taken the risky course of action to “emasculate” the military. 
General Ozkok oversaw additional actions that included the following changes 
highlighted by the 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress. The reforms adopted in 
2001 later became part of the Constitution. 
The advisory nature of the NSC was confirmed in a law implementing the 
amendment of October 2001 relating to Article 118 of the Constitution, 
which also increased the number of civilians in the NSC. In an amendment 
to the Law on the National Security Council the provision that "the NSC 
will report to the Council of Ministers the views it has reached and its 
suggestions" has been abrogated. The representative of the NSC in the 
Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music has been removed by an 
amendment to the relevant Law. However, there remains a representative 
of the National Security Council on other civilian boards such as the High 
Audio-Visual Board (RTÜK) and the High- Education Board (YÖK).163
The reform measures enacted in he TAF under the leadership of General Ozkok 
make it clear he is for membership in the European Union and that he has been successful 
in making the military appear to be “acting as one.” On April 20th, 2005, General Ozkok 
addressed the Turkish War Colleges. The subjects in his speech ventured into the political 
realm. The General’s language seemed more appropriate for the leader of a nation instead 
of a General addressing his troops. Ozkok acknowledged the strength of the EU and 
affirmed Turkey’s desire to become a full member of the EU, but not at the expense of 
the country’s dignity. 
Turkey’s interest lies in being a full member of the EU… However, I 
would like to reiterate that the right thing to do and the thing that we 
desire is to be a full member of the EU with our dignity and commitment. 
At the end of a long and challenging process of negotiations, with the 
priority given to the realization of the mutual harmonization; openness,  
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transparency, mutual respect, good will, mutual understanding and balance 
between the risks undertaken and the stage reached are of vital 
importance.164
An important element of his speech was the military’s recognition that the 
security environment had changed. Ozkok said “[r]ecently, economic power has become 
the most distinctive element of national power. What is most striking today is the fact that 
‘security’ and ‘economic development’ are accepted as the two very closely related 
concepts.”165 This is significant because it shows the change in preferences by the 
military towards getting into the EU. Following the reforms, General Ozkok made a 
gesture which signaled he was “prepared to accept the rearrangement of the relationship 
between the nation’s armed forces and the civilian administration in order to move 
towards conformation with EU standards.”166 “By not rejecting change, Ozkok 
confirmed that the TGS recognizes the importance of avoiding the perception that it is an 
impediment on the path to the EU.”167
Given the number of changes and the relative ease with which they were 
accomplished, it begs the question: Why did the reforms occur now instead of before 
1998? The military recognizes that greater than 75% of the population support EU 
membership. The remaining 25% is not opposed to EU membership. They just distrust 
the EU’s double standards. The armed forces also understand its reputation in society is 
in jeopardy if it is perceived as a roadblock to membership.168 In this case, the military 
actually “wins by losing.” At the expense of losing some of its formal power to intervene 
in politics, the Turkish Armed Forces strengthens its informal power in society. 
3. Harmonization? 
Harmonization is the process of aligning a country’s laws with the requirements 
of the EU. The concept was developed with the intention of expediting the process of 
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expansion. The 7th Harmonization package approved by Turkey’s parliament, at least in 
theory, rolls back the political role of the military to the levels of the 1950s before the 
MGK was created.169
The Turkish Grand National Assembly worked hard to pass through the 6th and 7th 
Harmonization packages designed to bring Turkish laws even closer to the European 
laws. Although President Sezer vetoed the 6th harmonization package that targeted the 
strict anti-terror laws of the government and liberalized measures for the Kurdish 
speaking population, the parliament was able to garner enough votes to override the veto. 
In order to get the bill passed, Prime Minister Erdogan sold the idea to the Grand 
National Assembly by invoking the desires of the military by saying that “How can you 
know better than the [Turkish General Staff]? They would know best. They want it this 
way. So, vote accordingly.”170 The bill was approved the last week in July. Almost 
directly on the heels of that vote came the 7th Harmonization package. These reforms 
adopted in July - August 2003 introduced some fundamental changes to the duties, 
functions and composition of the MGK. An amendment to the Law on the National 
Security Council (No 2495) abolished the extended executive and supervisory powers of 
the Secretary General of the MGK. The Secretary General no longer has the authority to 
follow up on the President or the Prime Minister regarding the implementation of any 
recommendation made by the MGK. This was clearly in response to the 1997 “post 
modern” coup where the MGK pressured Prime Minister Erbakan to put into action the 
recommendations to curb the rise of political Islam. 
Erbakan’s resignation and the banning of the Refah Parti (RP) in 1997 
temporarily subdued the armed forces’ struggle with the rise in radical Islam. The 2002 
election was almost an exact repeat of the 1996 election. The middle of the road parties 
failed to gain electoral support which allowed the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Parti -- AKP) to win a majority in Parliament. However, there are two 
differences between the results of the 1996 and 2002 elections. First, the AKP achieved a 
majority in Parliament despite only winning 34% of the vote. The CHP came in second 
and no other political party crossed the 10% threshold required to gain a seat in the Grand 
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National Assembly.171 This gave the AKP over a 2:1 advantage in the assembly.172 The 
second difference was that Turkey was now a candidate for the European Union. 
The AKP had known Islamic ties and had the least interest in joining the EU. 
Another outcome of the election was the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Turkey’s 
new Prime Minister. In 1998 Erdogan, who was formerly the mayor of Istanbul, spent 4 
months in prison for publicly reciting a poem with “nationalist content and ethnic 
motifs.”173 Erdogan was a disciple of Erbakan until they ideologically split ways after the 
“soft” coup of 1997. He is a devout practicing Muslim but has so far proven to be 
moderate.174 Without the watchful eyes of the EU, his election by Parliament to become 
the Prime Minister could have reenergized the friction, coup, power pattern. The 
religiously based constituency of the AKP remained “Euroskeptic” throughout the 
campaign. After it won the elections, its leadership pushed the EU membership 
agenda.175
Prime Minister Erdogan inherited the harmonization process already in progress. 
In less than one year of his administration, regulations modifying the tasks of the Office 
of the Secretary General were adopted. One of the most important changes was that the 
Secretary General will no longer be reserved exclusively for a military officer. Instead, 
the Secretariat would be nominated by the President and approved by the Prime Minister. 
In addition, the Secretariat General would have considerably less powers. Rather than 
being able to speak on a number of different topics with impunity, the Secretariat General 
would only be responsible for setting the agenda for the Security Council meetings. 
According to press reports, General Ozkok and PM Erdogan were at odds over the issue 
of a civilian Secretary General at this point in time. While the military was not opposed  
171 Insel, Ahmet. (2003) “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey,” The South Atlantic 
Quarterly, 102.2/3 (2003). Found on the web at: 
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to the idea, they wanted a one year moratorium on the decision. True to the agreement, 
the post of the Secretary General was relinquished to Yigit Alpogan a former Turkish 
Ambassador to Greece in August of 2004.176 Additionally, the frequency of the meetings 
of the MGK has been modified. The council will under normal circumstances be 
convened every two months instead of monthly. A move such as this may be an attempt 
to slowly remove the MGK from the decision making process all together. 
The Court of Auditors is now authorized to “audit accounts and transactions of all 
types of organizations including the state properties owned by the armed forces.”177 The 
audits are still restricted under Article 160 of the Constitution under which the 
confidentiality of the national defense is foreseen. Even with the ability to audit the 
armed forces, the military continues to enjoy a substantial autonomy in preparing and 
establishing the defense budget as well as in public procurement in areas related to 
defense.178
The EU has voiced concern over three additional prerogatives of the military. 
First, the military controls two extra-budgetary funds. One of the funds relates to a 
defense industry support fund responsible for the allocation of defense resources. The 
second concern is the sheer magnitude of military spending. As of 2003, national defense 
consumed approximately 7% of the budget. 
Besides the MGK, the EU is concerned about the armed forces ability to exert 
influence through a series of informal mechanisms. On various occasions’ military 
members of the MGK expressed their opinions about political, social and foreign policy 
matters in public speeches, statements to the media and declarations. This still continues. 
However, it appears the EU does not mind the situation as long as the pro-EU and pro-
reform messages from Gen Ozkok continue. 
 
176 Turkish Press Review, 8/19/2004, available on the web at: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2004/08/04x08x19.HTM#%207 (Last accessed on 
June 3, 2005). 
177 Salmoni, Barak (2003) “Turkey’s Summer 2003 Legislative Reforms: EU Avalanche, Civil-
Military Revolution, or Islamist assertion?” Strategic Insight, Vol II, 9 (September 2003). Available on the 
web at: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept03/europe.asp (Last accessed on 3 June 2005). 
178 Commission of the European Communities (2003), Regular Report 2003, 19-25. 
53 
                                                
Overall, the Constitutional amendments were intended to significantly modify the 
functioning of the National Security Council. But in order to align civilian control of the 
military with practice in EU members, these reforms must be effectively implemented.179  
The Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession in October 2004 
makes the following statements regarding civil-military relations: 
On civil-military relations, the government has increasingly asserted its 
control over the military. In order to enhance budgetary transparency the 
Court of Auditors was granted permission to audit military and defense 
expenditures. Extra-budgetary funds have been included in the general 
budget, allowing for full parliamentary control. In August 2004, for the 
first time a civilian was appointed Secretary General of the National 
Security Council. The process of fully aligning civil-military relations 
with EU practice is underway; nevertheless, the armed forces in Turkey 
continue to exercise influence through a series of informal mechanisms.180
It appears the Turkish government and the military have negotiated a way 
to adopt the institutional changes required. The question becomes whether or not 
the changes will stick. In his Strategic Insights Article, Barak Salmoni muses 
whether or not the reforms of summer 2003 represent a “revolution in civil-
military relations.”181 At the time of his article it was too early to tell. After 
almost 2 years since the reforms, it appears this was not quite a revolution but 
only a first step towards civilian control. 
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AFTER THE HARMONIZATION 
PACKAGES 
After the implementation of the institutional reforms required by the European 
Union, what is the status of democratic civilian control of its armed forces (DCAF)? This 
section empirically shows how rolling back the military’s instruments of power, namely 
the National Security Council, brought the status of DCAF closer to the ideal of civilian 
control.  But  because  of  the  military’s  informal  powers, the armed forces are not fully  
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under civilian control. The 2004 EU report on Turkey’s progress towards accession 
echoes these remarks. However, the reforms must have been “good enough” since Turkey 
has gained EU candidacy. 
There are two opinions on why civilian control still has not been achieved. 
According to former European Parliament member, Arie Oostlander, Turkey needs more 
institutional changes. In his opinion, Turkey should have continued with reforms by 
subordinating the National Security Council to the Minister of National Defense and 
opening the military budget to full control of the parliament. In addition, the parliament 
should have access to the military’s OYAK funds.182 Breaking down the structures 
should lead to changes in the norms and principles of the military allowing it to accept 
civilian control. 
On the other hand, political science professor Umit Cizre suggests the EU is too 
focused on institutional changes. According to Cizre, the European Union suffers from 
“institutional bias.” She explains that the bias displayed by NATO and the EU in the age 
of expansion to the central and eastern European countries has carried over into the EU 
expansion regarding Turkey. The “mere institutional reform of civil-military relations 
will often fail to identify and respond to an underlying web of unspoken and maybe 
invisible systems of sustenance that legitimize the military’s ability to influence 
[politics].”183 Instead, the answer lies in creating a new military culture willing to accept 
and respect civilian control.184 New laws and constitutional amendments alone will not 
appreciably change Turkey’s established pattern of civil-military relations. Taking this 
concept to the extreme, it would mean challenging the military’s legitimacy as the 
guardian of the state and the principles of Kemalism as defined by the military.  
Both perspectives have merit and are essential to achieve civilian control. It is 
clear the EU does have an institutional bias. Part of this may be because it is easier to 
measure changes in structure than it is in culture. In other words, success should not just 
be measured by the structure and institutions present. It is also important that they operate 
correctly. However, the principle of democratic civilian control will not persist without a 
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change in culture. In the case of Turkey, dismantling the National Security Council is 
only the first step in reversing the friction, coup, and power cycle that turned the military 
into the most prominent actor in Turkey’s politics. 
The 7th Harmonization package had the effect of removing the decision-making 
structures of the military and reducing its formal power. As demonstrated in Figure 3, the 
status of DCAF empirically shifted from its value in 1997 to the position in 2004. 







Low Political Power of the Military















Figure 3. Turkey’s Civil-Military Relations in 2004 
 
 It is important to understand that the impetus for the changes to Turkey’s 43 year 
old National Security Council came from the EU and not from within the Turkish 
population, politicians, or the armed forces. At the same time, the legislation was not 
written by the “omniscient” EU but came about through a series of negotiations between 
the military and the Prime Minister. In this case, General Ozkok met with the Prime 
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Minister and unlike 1971 or 1997 the armed forces agreed to compromise.185 The key 
word is “compromise” which means the armed forces relinquished only what it was 
willing to surrender. For example, the military held fast on its desire to keep an officer as 
the Secretary General of the MGK for a one year transition period. 
 The changes agreed to by the military do not represent a change in its desire to be 
the guardian of society. Instead it represents a change in tactics. Rather than contesting 
the AKP and the civilian politicians on every issue, the military has adopted a “wait and 
see” approach. The Turkish Armed Forces have relinquished as much power as they are 
willing to give. From their perspective it is now up to the politicians to run the 
government correctly. To use a basketball analogy, the military has shifted from a “man-
to-man” defense to a “zone” defense. Rather than challenge the politicians on every issue, 
the military is going to let the government bend, but not break. Chapter V outlines four 
different scenarios for the future of Turkey’s civil-military relations. 
 
185 Ciftci (2003), 2. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS:  THE FUTURE OF TURKEY’S CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS 
While it is supposedly politically neutral, the armed forces evolved into Turkey’s 
most powerful political actor. From 1960 through 1997, the political power of the 
military increased over time in a definite pattern. Civil-military friction led to a military 
coup which increased the power of the military. In each of the four interventions, the 
military quickly returned to a democracy, but not before cementing the formal institutions 
like the National Security Council which provided the military with more influence in the 
State’s political decision making process. 
During the Cold War, the status of civil-military relations and the guardian 
behavior of the TAF was condoned and even expected by the international community. 
The domestic results and the international attitudes towards Turkey legitimized the coup 
d'état as a viable tactic. The international community allowed this because NATO 
regarded the stability of Turkey as a higher priority than democracy. This philosophy 
lasted until the mid-1990s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the 
Soviet threat, Turkey’s pattern of civil-military relations was no longer acceptable. This 
became apparent after the “No” decision on Turkey’s EU membership bid at the 
Luxembourg summit in 1997. Following the conference, the EU issued progress reports 
linking the structure of Turkey’s civil-military relations to its membership chances. Even 
after Turkey received the go ahead for EU candidacy in 1999, the message was clear that 
Turkey would have to change if it wanted full membership in the European club. 
In order to comply with the EU political requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria, 
Turkey changed the form and function of its National Security Council. These reforms 
brought the character of civil-military relations closer to the ideal of civilian control but 
did not achieve it. The 7th Harmonization package complied with everything the EU 
required. This leads to a discussion on the future of Turkey’s civil-military relations 
which can be determined from four scenarios. They are: 
1. A New Status Quo: 
2. Movement towards a “Defanged” Military: 
3. Movement towards “Civilian Control” 
4. A return to the friction, coup, pattern 
The possibilities can be divided in two categories based on the involvement of the 
European Union. The first three scenarios are possible only if the EU remains engaged 
with Turkey and continues accession talks. The last situation is possible only if EU-
Turkey accession talks break down either because the EU abandons Turkey or Turkey 
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 Figure 4. The Future of Turkey’s Civil-Military Relations 
 
A. EU AND TURKEY REMAIN ENGAGED 
1. A New Status Quo 
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The 2003 reforms and pressure by the EU have moved Turkey’s civil-military 
relations closer to civilian control. While it has shifted more power to the civilian 
government, it has not legitimized civilian control. The military still has support from 
society as the most trusted institution and the guardianship role. The functional difference 
between 2004 and 1997 is that the military is adopting a “wait and see” tactic regarding 
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the AKP government instead of challenging the politicians on very issue. This shows the 
military is willing to let the AKP succeed or fail on its own. 
2. Movement towards a “Defanged Military” 
An increase in civil-military friction while the military has less political power 
can lead to a “defanged military” where the military loses all of its autonomy. A situation 
where this may occur is if the politicians attempt to cut the military’s retirement fund 
(OYAK). Especially under the watchful eyes of the EU, the result will be a decrease in 
the prestige and material wealth of the military. This is the least desirable and least likely 
scenario. 
3. Movement towards “Civilian Control” 
In this scenario, further movement towards the civilian control will happen if the 
definition of Kemalism moves closer to EU ideals. To use a metaphor, the wrong way to 
go about this process is to replace Ataturk with Monnet. Instead, the best way is to 
continue the harmonization process. The structure of the decision-making system has 
been reduced making the next step a change. Another way this could happen is through 
the retirement of the senior level generals that remember all of the coups. This represents 
the regime theory of CMR where “norms” and “values” become important. This can 
happen through education and changes in Kemalism.186
B. EU-TURKEY ACCESSION TALKS BREAKDOWN 
1. A Return to the Friction, Coup, Power Cycle 
What would cause the talks to breakdown? Until June of 2005, there was a danger 
that the EU would reject Turkey outright. However, now it appears the EU-Turkey talks 
are in danger if the European’s reject its own creation. There is still a slim possibility that 
Turkey could decide not to be part of the EU. Given the recent French and Dutch “No” 
votes on the EU Constitution, has increased the probability that Turkey will not achieve 
full membership. General Ozkok’s words may become a reality. Without the pressure 
from the EU, the friction, coup, power cycle can reemerge. This would be the worst case 
for the quality of Turkey’s democracy. 
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